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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates complementarities between different sources of research funding 
with regard to academic publishing. We find for a sample of UK engineering academics that 
competitive funding is associated with an increase in ex-post publications but that industry funding 
decreases the marginal utility of public funding by lowering the publication and citation rate increases 
associated with public grants. However, when holding all other explanatory variables at their mean, 
the negative effect of the interaction does not translate into an effective decrease in publication and 
citation numbers. The paper also shows that the positive effect of public funding is driven by UK 
research council and charity grants and that EU funding has no significant effect on publication 
outcomes. 
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1 Introduction 
In academic research, competitive funding is considered crucial for increasing research 
output (Stephan 1996, 2012). Public research grants have repeatedly been found to positively 
affect research productivity (Benavente et al., 2012; Chudnovsky et al., 2008; Hottenrott and 
Thorwarth, 2011; Jacob and Lefgren, 2011; Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011). It is 
important to note, however, that researchers receive grants from several sources. Recent 
research on the concurrence of different types of funding in selected countries shows that 
academic publications report an average of 2.4 to 3.3 funding agents per paper (Wang et al., 
2012). 
Multiple funding sources facilitate resource-intensive research, while creating the challenge 
to attribute research efforts and human resources to each project. Importantly, given the 
significant effects of industry grants on research outcomes (Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; 
Banal-Estanol et al., 2013), it is of interest whether industry sponsorship accelerates or 
compromises the positive effect of public research funding. In other words, studying the 
effects of public funding on research output may require taking other funding channels into 
account. 
Besides increasing use of competitive research grants from public funding authorities, 
research sponsorship from the private sector has grown in importance over the past decades 
in most OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Previous work has identified the various forms of 
interactions between industry and academia (e.g. Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Cohen et al, 
2002) and studied intensively the effect of such interactions on research outcomes (e.g. 
Blumenthal et al., 1996; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; 
Banal-Estanol et al., 2013). It has been claimed that industry partners may direct academics 
towards applied research and limit or delay the public dissemination of research results 
(Blumenthal et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1998; Czarnitzki et al. 2011). These papers conclude 
that academics' general duties and research duties in particular may be compromised by an 
increase in time allocated to industry-sponsored research and development, consulting and 
commercialisation.  
If industry partners determine research topics and demand secrecy then also public funding 
placed with such industry sponsored researchers may suffer from limitations and result in a 
decrease in research output (Cohen et al, 1998). This is particularly critical in light of 
shrinking institutional core budgets that induce researchers to increasingly look for other 
channels to fund  their research. On the other hand, several studies have argued that industry 
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can provide not only funds but also ideas for research (Mansfield, 1995; Lee, 2000; Siegel et 
al., 2003; Hottenrott and Lawson, 2013). Researchers may be able to benefit in their 
academic work from closer links with industry as insights into applied processes and 
problems in industry may provide the ideas for new ground-breaking research (Rosenberg 
1998). If researchers obtain new ideas through links with industry then also the expected 
benefits from public funding placed with these researchers should increase as a result of 
positive complementarities (Mansfield, 1995; Zucker et al., 1996, 1998).  
Thus, it is important to note that industry sponsorship cannot be evaluated without 
considering its impact on productivity effects from other types of funding, which could be 
positive or negative. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating the joint effect of 
funding from public and private sponsors on the research productivity of a sample of UK 
engineering academics. Using data on research income of 809 individual researchers at 15 
UK universities we are able to investigate potential complementarities and substitution 
effects between different sources of private-sector and public-sector funding and how they 
affect publication and citation rates of the sponsored academics. Previous studies have shown 
a positive effect of competitive funding on publication output but that larger shares of 
research funding coming from industry are associated with publication rate decreases 
(Manjarres-Henriquez et al., 2008; Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; Banal-Estanol et al., 
2013). Our results add to these insights by showing firstly that competitive research grants 
are associated with higher research output. Looking at public sources of funding that  include 
funding from the UK research councils, UK charities and EU funding, the paper also shows 
that only UK public funding increases publication and citation rates. Industry funding, 
however, decreases the marginal utility of public funding by decreasing the publication and 
citation rate increase associated with public grants. The negative effect of the interaction does 
not translate into an effective decrease in publication or citation numbers. Even for very high 
amounts of industry funding we still observe a positive effect of public funding on 
publications. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the literature on 
research funding and productivity and section 3 introduces the empirical model and 
methodology. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the results. In section 6 we 
conclude. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Research funding and research productivity 
In many countries in Europe where universities have primarily been financed through block 
grants, governments have introduced or increased the amount of funding distributed through 
competitive funding schemes (Stephan, 2012). Additionally, shrinking public research 
budgets meant that researchers are increasingly encouraged to look for funding elsewhere, e.g. 
source funding from industry and other sponsors. This resulted in a shift towards private 
sponsorship in most OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Competitive funding has been seen as a 
mechanism to reward and thus provide incentives for the most able researchers. It allows 
researchers to secure funding for equipment and research assistance, leading to more 
autonomy and flexibility. Competitive funding is thus usually accompanied by an increase in 
research productivity, regardless the sponsor (Stephan, 2012), and researchers that receive 
some external funding outperform their colleagues who do not acquire external grants 
(Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011; Banal-Estanol et al., 2013). 
However, few papers have analysed the concurrence of different types of funding. Wang et al. 
(2012) analyse named sponsors on academic publications in 10 selected countries. They show 
for the UK that 43% of academic publications acknowledge external funding and report an 
average of 2.8 funding agents per paper. They also observe that the UK funding system is 
particularly diversified, with no one funding agent dominating. In our data we will see that 
more than 50% of researchers receive funding for at least one year. Of these, 47% receive 
public grants and industry funding simultaneously at least once. This points to the importance 
of analysing potential complementary or substitution effects between grants from different 
funding agents. 
 
2.2 Industry funding and research productivity 
Industry grants have been identified as a major source of funding for academic research in 
recent years. In the US the so called competitiveness crisis prompted a series of structural 
changes in the intellectual property regime accompanied by several incentive programs 
designed specifically to promote collaboration between universities and industry (Lee, 2000).  
In many subject areas, including engineering and material science, much of the research 
would not be possible without the input of industry partners. In a survey of 671 academic 
scientists and engineers, Lee (2000) reports securing of funds for equipment and research 
assistants as the principal reason for collaboration with industry, leading to more autonomy 
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and flexibility for academic researchers. Further, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argue that 
university researchers may be motivated to interact with private companies for reasons other 
than access to additional research funding, for example finding potential co-authors and ideas 
for their research agenda. Also, Lee (2000) identified the acquisition of research ideas as one 
of the main motives for researchers to pursue joint research with industry. Mansfield (1995) 
reported that a substantial number of university research projects were initiated through 
consulting activities within firms. This did not only apply to industry-sponsored projects, also 
research projects sponsored by public agents were influenced by problems from industry. 
Thus, through the provision of additional grants and contact to real-world problems, industry 
sponsorship could also increase the marginal benefits associated with public grants. 
However, more than just providing an attractive source of additional research funding to 
supplement the department’s core resources, external sponsorship involves contractual 
agreements and research guidance that may potentially affect academic research. Specifically, 
the objectives of different sponsors may influence the choice of research topics and the 
choice of dissemination channels (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Cohen et al., 1998; Benner and 
Sandström, 2000) and industry sponsors may have a particular interest in influencing research 
and dissemination channels to recover their investments. Accordingly, Blumenthal et al. 
(1996) argue that industry may direct researchers towards applied research and limit or delay 
the release of publications. Blumenthal et al. (2006) and Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find 
evidence of publication delay and secrecy associated with industry funding. Such evidence 
points towards a potential negative effect of industry involvement on publication rates which 
could further result in a negative effect on marginal benefits associated with simultaneously 
received public funding. 
Empirical evidence on the topic is mixed. Manjarres-Henriquez et al. (2008) and Banal-
Estanol et al. (2013) show a curvilinear effect of the share of industry funding on publication 
output which may be indicative of a complementary effect of public and private funding up to 
a certain threshold. Other recent studies instead show a consistent negative correlation 
between the share of industry grants and publication rates (Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011). 
In a recent paper, Hottenrott and Lawson (2013) find researchers that report industry as a 
source for research ideas to publish less than their peers that source research ideas from 
elsewhere. Their findings suggest that ideas coming from industry do not translate into more 
or better quality publications. Thus, the potential negative effect of industry funding might 
merely be off-set through public grants instead of creating true complementarities. 
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2.3 Different sources of public funding 
While most papers only differentiate between public and private funding, it is important to 
note that not all public funding is alike. Researchers source funding from a variety of public 
sources and there is evidence that some public sponsors promote research more effectively 
than others. Azoulay et al. (2011) study the impact of funding from two different public 
sponsors with different grant design and agenda. They find that funding from the Howard 
Hughes Medical Institute's, a sponsor that allows for more scientific freedom perform 
significantly better than a group of similar researchers funded by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH).  
Just as US academic life scientists rely on NIH funding for their research, UK engineering 
academics rely on funding from the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council 
(EPSRC). With the increasing competitiveness of these grants more researchers are turning 
towards the European Commission Framework Programmes for research sponsorship. While 
both sponsors have specific research lines they promote, European Union (EU) grants are 
organised in funding periods and around research actions, often involving researchers from 
several countries. The main difference, however, lies in the administrative burden associated 
with EU grants (Grimpe, 2012). We could thus expect them to affect academic research 
output differently. Indeed, Grimpe (2012) found for a sample of German academics that 
while research council grants go to the most able academics, EU grants are not strongly 
correlated with prior research publications. Grimpe (2012) further analyses the effect of 
different types of funding on the receipt of EU grants and shows that they are not acquired 
complementary to any other research funding but perhaps only being pursued when other 
funding channels are not available. We could therefore expect that also in terms of their effect 
on publication outcomes industry grants may complement research council or EU grants 
differently. Further, we may expect potential substitution effects between research council 
and EU grants in terms of their effect on publications.1  
 
                                                            
1 Similarly, government grants that are not mediated by the research councils may have a different effect on 
research output. Such grants may be mission oriented and not awarded through peer review. Goldfarb (2008), 
for example, finds that researchers repeatedly funded by NASA experience a reduction of their research output. 
Grimpe (2012) finds that government grants are acquired complementary only to industry grants and are not 
correlated to research output variables. 
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3 Empirical Model 
We base our model of research funding complementarity on the notion of utility 
maximisation of the academic. An academic exerts different research efforts aimed at 
producing measurable research outputs with the goal of maximising her utility. Although 
researchers in science have repeatedly been shown to possess a “taste” for science and derive 
satisfaction from “puzzle solving” (Stephan, 1996, 2012; Stern, 2004; Sauermann and Roach, 
2013), the literature assumes that academics derive their utility primarily from publications in 
peer reviewed journals. Publications in peer-reviewed journals in turn provide substantial 
benefits in terms of career, salary and internal and external recognition (Dasgupta and David, 
1994; Stephan, 1996, 2012). 
We consider funding from at least two types of funding agents as inputs to the utility function. 
External resources are crucial for scientific production (Stephan, 1996, 2012) and the number 
of publications is increasing with funding received from external sponsors (Kelchtermans and 
Veugelers, 2011; Banal-Estanol et al., 2013). However, while publication numbers are 
assumed to be non-decreasing with research input, this does not rule out diminishing returns 
or trade-offs between different types of resources as shown by Manjarres-Henriquez et al. 
(2009) and Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2011).  
Facing time-constraints academics have to choose how much time to devote to each sponsor 
to maximize their utility. In our set-up the different types of grants are not frictionless 
adjustable as they are subject to different adjustment costs and are accompanied by different 
expectations of the sponsors. Earlier research has found that funding from industry is less 
targeted at the production of scientific publications and basic research than unrestricted 
funding from public sponsors (Blumenthal et al., 1996). Funding from industry is thus 
considered restricted funding that may potentially adversely affect a researcher’s publication 
behaviour (Cohen et al., 1998). The direct involvement of industry sponsors into the research 
process as well as the supervision of contract research and the exchange of results may limit 
the disclosure of research results or lead to publications that are of lower quality than 
research that receives funding from public sponsors. Moreover, researchers may encounter 
conflicting incentives and guidelines in their research when receiving funding from more than 
one agent. Public funding aimed at free dissemination may be contradicted with industry 
funding, resulting in a substitution between different grants. Alternatively, contacts with an 
industry sponsor may help generate new ideas for research (Lee, 2000) and the different 
grants could instead be complements in a researcher’s production function.  
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The production function in its most general form is then given by: 
௜ܲ௧ሺ߮ሻ ൌ ݂൫ܨଵ௜௧ିଵ, ܨଶ௜௧ିଵ, ௜ܺ௧|߮	൯,      (1) 
where ܨଵ௜௧ିଵ  and ܨଶ௜௧ିଵdenote two different types of funding allocated in t-1, where one 
could be considered public, science oriented funding and the other funding from industry. Xit 
are other explanatory factors like rank, patents or gender. We then include the notion of a 
positive increase from either type of funding with potential substitution or complementarity 
effects: 
௜ܲ௧ሺ߮ሻ ൌ ߮ ቂܨଵ௜௧ିଵ൅ܨଶ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ܨଵ௜௧ିଵܨଶ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ቃ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (2) 
where φ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term given as εit=uit+ 
vi+τt, where vi is the unobserved individual effect, and τt is the time fixed effect. 
Thus, to estimate the existence and extent of any complementary or substitution effect 
between different types of funding we interact the two funding variables and estimate their 
joint effect.  
We estimate count data models as the number of publications are by nature positive and the 
data is characterised by a large number of zeros. We assume the outcome variables to have a 
negative binomial distribution and use a model that accounts for the skewed nature of the 
data employing a specification of the form:  
ܧሺ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሼߚଵൣܨଵ௜௧ିଵ൧ ൅ ߚଶൣܨଶ௜௧ିଵ൧ ൅ ߚଵଶൣܨଵ௜௧ିଵܨଶ௜௧ିଵ൧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሽ	 ሺ3ሻ	
In the case of continuous variables in non-linear models the interaction effect is the cross-
derivative of the expected marginal change in publications. For example, the marginal effect 
of funding ܨଵ௜௧ିଵ on our dependent variable Pit is derived as the first derivative of (3):  
డாሺ௉ሻ
డிభ ൌ ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଵଶܨଶሻܧሺܲሻ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ4ሻ	
Then, derived from (4) the marginal change of funding ܨଵ௜௧ିଵ  on the dependent variable Pit 
with respect to the interaction term ܨଶ௜௧ିଵ  can be written as: 
డாሺ௉ሻ
డிభడிమ ൌ ߚଵଶܧሺܲሻ ൅ ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଵଶܨଶሻሺߚଶ ൅ ߚଵଶܨଵሻܧሺܲሻ	 	 	 ሺ5ሻ	
Any two types of funding are classified as complements if the sign of the cross derivative is 
positive, i.e. if an increase in industry funding increases the marginal utility of public funding. 
If instead, an increase in industry funding decreases the utility of public funding they are 
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considered as substitutes on the outcome variable Pit. If the cross-derivative is zero then we 
would observe a purely additive relationship between the two types of funding where one 
could replace the other without compromising its marginal utility.  
We estimate pooled models which have the advantage that they relax the strict exogeneity 
assumption of a fixed effects model. However, they do not control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (ݒ௜ ). In our case such unobserved effects could be specific skills of each 
researcher that are positively correlated with the right hand side variables such as external 
funding and a potential endogeneity problem arises. For example, the literature suggests that 
more able researchers have many more opportunities to receive funding as grant awarding 
bodies screen researchers for their ability and sponsor the most productive. If unobserved 
individual heterogeneity is present, the estimated coefficient of the funding variables would 
be upwards biased. We can cope with this challenge if pre-sample information of the 
dependent variable is available. Specifically, Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) suggest a solution 
which controls for individual heterogeneity by specifying the average productivity of the 
academic before she enters the sample. The pre-sample mean of the dependent variable is a 
consistent estimator of the unobserved individual effect if it mainly corresponds to the 
intrinsic ability of an academic and her motivation, both factors that are not directly 
observable but may affect scientific productivity. Following Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) we 
can therefore account for unobserved individual heterogeneity by using pre-sample 
information of publications and citations. We include the log of the average number of 
publications published in a pre-sample period (in the period 1999 to 2001). In cases where the 
pre-sample value is zero, we include a dummy to capture the “quasi-missing” value.  
Theory further suggests that research activity is subject to dynamic feedback (Dasgupta and 
David, 1994) as each researcher’s performance is driven by cumulative unobserved factors 
(uit), e.g. learning, which are not controlled for through fixed effects. Blundell et al. (1995) 
therefore argue that it is important to consider continuous, sample-period dynamics when 
modelling research outcomes. To proxy for dynamic feedback within the sample period we 
calculate the stock of publications (and citations) published during the observation period. 
We assume that knowledge does not depreciate during the short sample period considered 
here (5 years). 
The pre-sample value and the stock variable are included in all estimations. This dual 
approach helps to address the problem of endogeneity that arises from correlated individual 
effects and through feedback from the dependent variable.  
10 
 
 
4 Data 
This paper evaluates the possible joint effects of different types of external sponsorship on 
publication output, using data on competitive research grants for UK engineering academics. 
Competitive grants represent research funding that an academic receives in addition to the 
university’s core funding. 
To gain access to grant information for academic researchers, we contacted 40 UK 
universities with engineering departments2. 15 of these universities sent detailed records 
containing information on private and public research grants received by their engineering 
staff during the period 2001 to 20063 (see Table A1 in Appendix A for a list of universities). 
The funding information was manually matched with name and rank information for all 
academic staff employed at engineering departments in the UK, as well as their publication 
records4. We supplemented this data with PhD year and subject information for all 885 
researchers that worked at the 15 universities during the whole period 2001 to 2006, whether 
they received funding or not. After exclusion of incomplete records the final data set contains 
809 engineering academics. Of these researchers, 58% received some external funding at 
least once during the six year observation period.  The descriptive statistics for the regression 
sample are reported in Table 1, correlations between the variables are reported in Table 2. 
4.1 Data collection and descriptive statistics 
Research Output 
The main variables of interest are research output and its quality, which are measured using 
researchers’ publication records. Publications were obtained from the ISI Web of Science 
database. We collected publications from when the researcher first joined the database (and 
were employed by one of the institutions in the full 40 university sample) up to 2007. Names 
                                                            
2 The 40 universities were selected based on a list of universities, for which staff and publication data had been 
collected as part of the ESRC project described in Banal-Estanol et al. (2013). 
3 6 more universities sent partial information, e.g. industry funding or researcher names were missing. For some 
of the 15 universities funding is available for earlier years, e.g. for 3 from 1990 onwards, for another 7 from 
1996 onwards. Funding was available until 2007 but due to missing values in the patent measure, 2007 has been 
dropped from the analysis. The period 2001 to 2006 is the preferred period for this analysis as it covers a larger 
number of universities and represents the assessment period for the 2008 RAE. The research information can 
therefore be expected to be fairly standardised across the 15 institutions and adjusted to the requirements of the 
RAE. 
4 The original data was collected based on staff registers in academic calendars and the name entries used as 
basis for gathering publications, patents and research council funding information for engineering academics at 
40 UK universities for the period 1985 to 2007 (Banal-Estanol et al., 2013). 
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were matched based on university address, last name and first initial. All database entries 
were cleaned manually to assure correct matching of publications to individual researchers.5  
Funding could have a different impact on research quality than it has on research quantity.  
We measure research quality using the number of citations received before the end of 2012 
by articles published in t. In other words, for publications published in 2002 we consider a 
citation window of ten years while for publications published in 2006 we consider a citation 
window of six year.6  
To summarize, we measure publication output as the number of publications in t 
(PUBLICATIONS) and quality adjusted publication output as the total number of citations 
received by publications published in t as of 2012 (CITATIONS). The mean number of 
publications during the observation period is 2.18 per academic per year and the citation 
count for these publications is 32.14. Further, 10% of the scientists in our sample did not 
publish during the entire six year period and 25% published less than one paper per year.  
For both measures we generate three-year pre-sample means (Pub_Mean and Cit_Mean) for 
the period 1999 to 2001 and a stock variable (Pub_Stock and Cit_Stock). These are included 
in all models to control for the ex-ante scientific quality of the scientist (time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity) and dynamic feedback (time-variant unobserved heterogeneity).  
Research Funding 
The competitive research income information obtained from the 15 universities includes the 
name of the principal investigator as well as data on funding source, award date, grant period 
and funding amount. We can attribute competitive income to five different sources: (1) 
industry and business, (2) UK research councils (mainly EPSRC), (3) UK charities, (4) UK 
government and (5) EU. All funding amounts were split across the award period to avoid 
focussing the entire amount at the start of the grant and to account for the length of the 
research project. In other words, if the grant lasted two years we split it equally across those 
two years, if it lasted over three or more years, the first and the last years (which are assumed 
                                                            
5 Publications without address data had to be ignored. However, we expect this missing information to be 
random and to not affect the data systematically. 
6 Citation counts are inherently truncated because at any point in time when collecting the citation count per 
article we may naturally miss out citations to that publication in the future. However, Hall et al. (2005), stress 
for the case of patents that the bulk of citations usually occurs early in a patent life cycle, and more precisely in 
a three to ten-year window. Similar results are found for the development of publication citations (Glaenzel et 
al., 2003; Adams, 2005) Thus, even a six-year window should capture the peak in citations for each publication. 
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to not represent full calendar years) received half the share of an intermediate year. This was 
done in order to account for the on-going benefits and implications of a project.  
Funding received in t-1 is used to capture the impact of financial resource on scientific 
productivity in t. We firstly look at the overall effect of competitive funding (FUNDING). 
Then, we differentiate between funding received from industry (INDFUND) and from public 
agents (PUBFUND) which includes UK research council and UK charity funding 
(UKFUND) and EU funding (EUFUND). Charity funding is highly competitive and follows a 
peer-review process similar to that of the research councils and is therefore considered the 
same in this analysis.7  
After excluding some outliers 8  researchers receive on average £29,632 per year in 
competitive funding. Industry funding amounts to approximately £5,000 per academic per 
year, while public funding provides approximately £22,000 on average, with the majority 
being sourced from UK research councils and charities (circa £19,000). If we only consider 
researchers that receive some funding during the observation period, the average amount of 
competitive funding per year is £53,301 with approximately £9,000 coming from industry 
and £40,000 from public sponsors. The majority of researchers receive funding from more 
than one type of funding agent during the observation period. 42% of researchers, however, 
receive no external funding at all. Of those that receive external funding at least once, 60% 
are sponsored by industry (35% of the total sample). In terms of funding volume, UK 
research council and charity funding accounts for 65% of all external research income, 
funding from industry accounts for 17%, followed by EU with 11%.9  
Looking at funding received during one period, we find that 30% of funded researchers 
receive UK research council and charity grants and industry funding simultaneously at least 
once, 14% receive EU and UK public grants, 7% EU and industry funding, and 10% receive 
all three types of grants in one period. Table 2 reports the correlation between different types 
                                                            
7 UK government funding (GOVFUND) is not included in public funding as it may not be subject to the same 
peer-review process. Instead, it could be closer in nature to industry funding due to its applied nature. This is 
checked by adding government grants to public grants and assessing their fit in Appendix B. The result shows 
that in the case of UK engineering government grants could be considered public funding. 
8 Outliers were identified using average values of leverage and (normalized) residuals following a linear 
regression of funding on publication outputs and are excluded using DFFITS (Belsley et al., 1980). We follow 
Bollen and Jackman (1990) and exclude observations with DFFITS>1, meaning that the observation shifts the 
estimate by one standard deviation. We repeat the process for all funding variables and in total exclude 14 
observation, most of which are EU funding outliers. Results for the full sample without exclusion of outliers are 
reported in Appendix B. 
9 The remaining 8% come from other government sources (see footnote7). 
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of funding and the outcome measures. We find a strong positive correlation between UK 
public and industry funding. EU funding correlates less strongly with other funding types. 
The correlation between the outcome and funding measures is positive and significant.  
To measure complementarity and substitution between different types of grants we multiply 
the funding variables to estimate interaction effects. In other words, we multiply industry 
funding (INDFUND) and public funding (PUBFUND) to measure any additional effect of a 
simultaneous involvement in both types of funded research projects. Further, we split public 
funding into UK public funding (UKFUND) and EU funding (EUFUND) to see if they 
interact differently with industry sponsorship and to investigate potential complementary 
effects between different types of public research grants. 
Control variables 
We include patents as additional control to all regressions as it has been shown that 
publications and patent outputs are correlated (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) and to account 
for alternative dissemination paths of researchers (PATENT). Patent data was obtained from 
the European Patent Office (EPO) database. We collected those patents that identify the 
aforementioned researchers as inventors and were filed while they were employed at one of 
the 15 institutions. Database construction required a manual search in the inventor database to 
identify those entries where the identity of the academic was certain. This was done by 
comparing addresses, titles and technology classes for all patents potentially attributable to 
each researcher. We did not only consider patents filed by the universities themselves, but 
also those assigned to third parties, e.g. industry or government agencies.10 We recorded the 
filing date of the patent as this represents the closest date to invention. The number of patents 
filed in t-1 is used in the regressions. The average number of patents per year is 0.06 and 0.39 
amongst those with at least one patent during the observation period. As the data were 
collected in 2008, only patents published by 2007, thus filed before 2006, are considered. 
Table 2 shows that as expected patents and publications are moderately correlated. Patents 
are only weakly correlated with funding but strongest with industry and EU funding. 
We account for academic rank by including a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
researcher was a professor in t-1 (PROFESSOR). Academic rank information was taken from 
university websites. Professors may have more resources available than lower ranked 
                                                            
10 Lawson (2013b) showed that in UK engineering more than 50% of inventions are not owned by the university 
but by private firms, government or individuals. 
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academics and may thus benefit more in terms of publication output than junior researchers. 
The rank variable is lagged by one period to allow for publication delays and avoid 
simultaneity with our outcome measure. PROFESSOR is strongly correlated with publication 
numbers and to a lesser extent with publication quality. It further is moderately correlated 
with all our funding measures. 
We control for gender (FEMALE) as previous literature has found a gender bias in both 
funding and academic productivity (Stephan, 2012). Women account for 7% of researchers in 
our sample. Table 2 shows that the gender dummy is not highly correlated to any of our main 
explanatory variables. We only find a negative significant sign for correlation with EU 
funding. 
To account for other individual effects, we collected personal information of researchers 
based on PhD data. PhD information was taken from Index to Theses, an online database 
which lists theses accepted for higher degrees by the universities of the UK and Ireland. It 
provides information on PhD institution, year and subject area. For researchers not listed in 
the database we searched their websites and gathered PhD details from the library catalogues 
of the PhD awarding university11. Of the 809 researchers for which personal information 
could be collected, 56 do not hold a PhD. As for the remaining 753 researchers, they received 
their PhDs between 1958 and 2006, with a mean PhD award year of 1984. The degrees come 
from 58 UK universities and more than 30 different institutions in 16 countries outside the 
UK. Based on the PhD information we include the researcher’s academic age (PHD_AGE) as 
the difference between the current year and the year of the PhD as a control to account for 
life-cycle effects. The correlation matrix shows that PHD_AGE is moderately correlated with 
our outcome variables but only weakly with the funding measures. We further include a 
dummy for those researchers that do not hold a PhD (NO_PHD), which represents 7% of the 
sample.  
Subject specialisation is based on the subject of the PhD as department division is not 
consistent across the 15 universities. In our sample 22% of researchers graduated in electrical 
and electronic engineering (ELECTRICAL), 21% in civil engineering (CIVIL), 15% hold a 
PhD in chemical engineering (CHEMICAL), 15% in physics (PHYSICS) and 13% in 
mechanical engineering (MECHANICAL). Just 8% have a background in life sciences (BIO). 
                                                            
11 This concerned some PhDs awarded in the UK that were not submitted to Index to Theses as well as PhDs 
awarded outside the UK and Ireland. 
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The correlation table shows some important differences by scientific field. Physics and 
chemical engineering are strongest correlated with our outcome measures. Physics is also 
positively correlated with funding, while civil engineering correlates negatively with all types 
of funding and the outcome measures. 
Year and university dummies are included in all regressions to control for potential institution 
or time fixed effects. Due to the short panel window institution specific measures (e.g. size, 
income) are not included as they do not differ significantly across time and any differences 
should be captured by the university fixed effect. 
4.2 Analysis of funding profiles 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics by type of funded researcher. Researchers are allowed to 
move between groups depending on their funding status in t-1. We differ between 
observations where a researcher receives (1) no public or private funding, (2) only private 
funding, (3) only public funding (UK and EU) and (4) both, private and public funding. The 
basic descriptive results show that all four groups are significantly different on most of our 
variables. They also show that researchers receiving funding produce more publications than 
those who do not. However, only for researchers with some public funding this difference is 
significant. Further, researchers receiving industry and public grants are most productive. 
This result also holds when looking at quality adjusted publication output. The descriptive 
results support our assumption of a positive production function and also point towards a 
complementary relationship between public and private sector grants. 
In terms of funding amount, it becomes clear that researchers that source funding from more 
than one source raise significantly more funding than researchers that rely on just one source. 
This suggests that as public grants are distributed based on peer review and can be expected 
to benefit the most able researchers, industry may look at public grants to inform their own 
funding decision and to identify potential partners for research (Perkmann et al., 2013). This 
group of highly sponsored and diversified researchers is also the group producing the largest 
number of patents. This is in line with the literature on star scientists (Zucker et al., 1996, 
2002) that suggests strong complementarities between high scientific ability, 
commercialisation and funding success.   
In terms of control variables we make some interesting observations. Significantly fewer 
female researchers can be found amongst the group of researchers that receive funding from 
industry alone. Researchers without a PhD are significantly less represented in the groups of 
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funded researchers, suggesting that they are less research but perhaps more teaching oriented. 
Age is significantly higher in the groups of researchers receiving public funding and highest 
amongst the top performing group. These also show the highest share of professors. We can 
further see that different scientific fields attract different types of funding. Researchers in 
bioscience are significantly more represented in the group that attracts funding from several 
sources, while researchers in physics are focussing on one agent at a time. Researches in 
mechanical engineering are more likely to be found amongst funded researchers, while 
researchers in chemical engineering are mostly found amongst those receiving no or only 
public funding. Electrical and electronic engineering faculty are less likely to only source 
funding from industry, while civil engineering researchers are more likely to be found 
amongst this group.  
 
5 Results 
5.1 Baseline results 
We firstly estimate the effects of funding on publication outcomes without differing between 
funding types to look at the overall effect of competitive funding. Table 4 reports the results 
for publication and citation outcomes. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
individual level. The results show that competitive funding has a positive effect on 
publication outcomes, supporting our positive production function assumption. 
The control variables are consistent across the two different specifications. Patents show a 
positive correlation with publication and citation numbers confirming prior research. 
Professors publish significantly more and of higher quality than junior researchers, perhaps 
due to better access to resources and experience. We do not find a significant difference 
between the publication rates of men and women. Researchers that do not hold a PhD also 
produce significantly fewer publications than their peers, indicating that they may focus 
primarily on teaching. Productivity and publication quality declines with age. Publication and 
citation numbers are lower in more applied fields of engineering and lowest in civil and 
mechanical engineering. University fixed effects and year effects are jointly significant. Our 
pre-sample mean and the dynamic feedback variables are both positive and significant 
pointing at the importance of controlling for individual unobserved effects.   
     [Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
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5.2 Interaction effects 
We secondly estimate the effect of different types of funding and their interactions on 
publication outcomes. For a correct interpretation of the interaction variable we calculate the 
cross-derivative for the joint effect of public and industry income holding all variables at their 
mean (following eq. (5)) and report the results in Table 5. The cross-derivative of the 
interaction term is negative (-0.074), indicating that while public funding positively correlates 
with publication numbers, the joint effect of industry and public funding is negative and they 
can be considered substitutive.  
We can illustrate the substitution effect by calculating the publication rate increase associated 
with public grants at different levels of industry funding. Let us consider a researcher 
receiving a mean value of £22,000 in public funding and a mean value of £5,000 of industry 
funding. For this researcher the marginal effect of public grants on the predicted value of 
publications is 0.077 (following eq. (4)). If instead the researcher receives the same amount 
of public grants but £10,000 in industry grants, then the marginal effect of public grants on 
the predicted publication rate would be 0.073. Thus, having a higher amount of industry 
grants reduces the benefit received from public grants. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of 
public funding on publications for different levels of industry funding. As can be gathered 
from these results, industry funding reduces the benefits from public funding and may 
compromise the positive effect of public funding in the top percentiles. Figure 1 also shows 
the difference between public funding at the mean and high amounts of public funding in the 
95 percentile (£105,000). The marginal benefits of higher amounts of public funding decrease 
as industry funding increases. Thus, industry funding decreases the marginal effect of public 
grants such that higher amounts of public funding do not translate into a proportionally higher 
number of publications. However, when holding all other explanatory variables at their mean, 
the negative effect of the cross-derivative does not translate into an effective decrease in 
publication numbers. Figure 2 represents the predicted number of publications for different 
levels of public funding. The number of publications increases but the rate of increase is 
smaller for higher amounts of industry funding as shown before. Still, the overall joint effect 
is positive. 
     [Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
The results are similar for citation counts. Public funding shows a positive sign, but again, the 
interaction term with industry funding is negative (Table 5). For a researcher receiving an 
average amount of industry grants(£5,000), public grants of £22,000 increase the predicted 
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number of citations by 1.811, while for a researcher receiving £10,000 from industry, public 
grants of £22,000 increase the predicted number of citations by only 1.666 (Figure 3). Figure 
3 shows that the difference between marginal effects of public funding at the mean and public 
funding in the 95 percentile decreases as industry funding increases. Figure 4 further shows 
that while public funding has a positive effect on citation numbers, these are lower if higher 
amounts of industry funding are sought. Above £70,000 in public funding, a researcher fares 
better not to increase the amount sourced from industry as this leads to a real decrease in the 
benefits from public funding. 
     [Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Columns two and four of Table 5 consider funding received from UK public agents, EU, and 
industry and include their interactions. The results show that only UK public funding is 
associated with higher publication output and quality. The interactions between public and 
industry funding are negative but only significant for UK public funding. Table 5 shows the 
cross-derivatives which confirm the negative interaction effect. The cross-derivative of the 
interaction between UK and EU funding is insignificant. This indicates that an increase in EU 
funding does not affect the benefit received from UK public funding. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper investigated empirically the existence of complementarities between public and 
private funding on scientific publication performance. The question is particularly critical as 
public budgets are shrinking and researchers are increasingly looking at other channels for 
supporting their research. Industry sponsoring relationships can provide ideas and resources 
for research that may open up new research lines (Mansfield, 1995). If this is the case then 
also the expected benefits from public funding could increase based on positive 
complementarities. On the other hand, previous research also expressed concerns that 
industry partners may direct academics towards applied research and limit or delay the 
dissemination of research results (Blumenthal et al., 1986, 1996; Cohen et al., 1998, 
Czarnitzki et al. 2011). If sponsors induce a shift of research topic or require secrecy then 
also public funding placed with such industry sponsored researchers may suffer limitations 
and the marginal utility of public grants may decrease.  
Using a sample of 809 researchers in engineering and controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we find that industry funding decreases the marginal utility of public funding 
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by decreasing the marginal effect of public grants on publication outcomes. This indicates 
that researchers are working at full capacity and increases in funding do not translate into 
comparative increases in research output when multiple sponsors are involved. This negative 
interaction effect was found for co-sponsorship from UK funders but was insignificant for 
EU grants. At the same time it is important to note that industry funding does not 
compromise the positive effect of public funding but only reduces the rate of publication 
increase associated with public grants. We further observed, that significant benefits in terms 
of publication output can only be observed for increases in UK public funding. The results 
show that EU funding does not independently increase publication rates but increases the 
marginal effect of the joint public funding variable. The results help to inform the debate on 
how industry and public funding jointly affect research productivity. In terms of policy 
implications we can conclude that it is important to maintain high levels of public funding to 
ensure the quality of the higher education research sector.  
This study is a first step to unleash the interactions between different types of competitive 
funding. We concentrated on the engineering field that is traditionally associated with 
industry and therefore may provide a lower threshold. We therefore strongly encourage 
further research taking into account other disciplines as funding environments continue to 
shift. The evidence presented here shows that this shift may not be without consequences for 
the development of the science base, even in applied sciences like engineering. Ours can only 
be a first attempt and more research is clearly needed to pin down the mechanisms behind the 
effect of industry grants that could be due to non-disclosure clauses or research themes less 
relevant to science. Blumenthal et al. (2006) and Czarnitzki et al. (2011) show evidence of 
secrecy clauses for researchers with industry grants that may also affect the release of 
publications from public grants. Hottenrott and Lawson (2013) further suggested that ideas 
from industry may not always lead to better research performance perhaps by simply not 
being relevant to science (see Perkmann and Walsh, 2009). With the comparability of our 
results in mind, we suggest further research on the dynamics underlying the sponsoring-
research outcome relationship in both qualitative and quantitative ways. In particular, the 
debate on research funding would benefit from investigating if and how funding relationships 
not only affect short-term scientific outcome, but also how they shape scientific careers. 
Researchers may specialize in certain types of grants and sponsors, and hence the type of 
research output they pursue.     
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Finally, it is important to stress that this study does not evaluate other benefits that may come 
from co-sponsorship. A more comprehensive assessment is therefore needed to establish if 
benefits for students, teaching or commercialisation of research as well as benefits for the 
sponsoring firms exist that contribute to the social returns from science and may therefore be 
of greater policy relevance than publications in scientific journals. 
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Appendix A 
See Table A1 
Appendix B 
Results including outliers 
Outliers were identified using average values of leverage and (normalized) residuals 
following a linear regression of funding on publication outputs. We repeated the process for 
all funding variables and in total excluded 14 observations, most of which were EU funding 
outliers at the University of Cambridge. To check if these outliers affect the results we 
estimate our regression including the excluded observations and report the marginal effects in 
Table B1. The results are very similar to the results presented in Table 5. However, some of 
the interactions with EU funding are significant, indicating that complementarities between 
UK and EU funding are significant if outliers are included.  
Results including government funding 
In our main regressions UK government funding was included in public funding as it may not 
be subject to the same peer-review process. Instead, it could be closer in nature to industry 
funding due to its applied nature. For German researchers Grimpe (2012) finds that 
government grants are acquired complementary to industry grants and are not correlated to 
research output variables. 
This is checked by adding government grants to public grants and assessing their fit. The 
results in Table B2 show that the marginal effects for all funding variables increase, 
indicating that government funding in the UK may be closer aligned to public funding than 
industry funding.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (4,031 observations) 
 mean sd min max 
Productivity measures     
PUBLICATIONSit (Publication number) 2.18 3.12 0 32 
CITATIONSit (Citation number) 32.14 79.12 0 1296 
Funding measures(in 100,000 GBP)     
FUNDINGit-1 0.30 0.90 0 12.12 
PUBFUNDit-1 0.22 0.79 0 11.15 
INDFUNDit-1 0.05 0.21 0 3.35 
UKFUNDit-1 0.19 0.76 0 11.15
EUFUNDit-1 0.03 0.14 0 2.29 
Patent measure     
PATENTit-1 0.06 0.32 0 8
Individual characteristics     
PROFESSORit-1 0.33 0.47 0 1 
FEMALEi 0.07 0.25 0 1
NO_PHDi 0.07 0.25 0 1 
PHD_AGEi 18.18 10.41 0 48 
BIOi 0.08 0.26 0 1
PHYSICSi 0.15 0.36 0 1 
MECHANICALi  0.13 0.34 0 1 
ELECTRICALi 0.22 0.41 0 1
CHEMICALi  0.15 0.36 0 1 
CIVILi 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Individual heterogeneity measure  
PUB_Meani  0.42 0.77 -0.69 3.26 
CIT_Meani  1.46 1.38 -1.79 6.39 
PUB_Stockit-1  6.07 9.19 0 131
CIT_Stockit-1  100.75 255.03 0 5975 
 
26 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix (4,031 observations) 
              
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 PUBLICATIONSit 1.000            
2 CITATIONSit 0.740*** 1.000           
3 FUNDINGit-1 0.190*** 0.127*** 1.000  
4 PUBFUNDit-1 0.175*** 0.118*** 0.956*** 1.000         
5 INDFUNDit-1 0.108*** 0.063*** 0.492*** 0.258*** 1.000        
6 UKFUNDit-1 0.158*** 0.103*** 0.935*** 0.984*** 0.239*** 1.000  
7 EUFUNDit-1 0.127*** 0.102*** 0.308*** 0.295*** 0.150*** 0.118*** 1.000      
8 PATENTit-1 0.142*** 0.151*** 0.040** 0.027* 0.065*** 0.015 0.069*** 1.000     
9 PROFESSORit-1 0.295*** 0.207*** 0.242*** 0.205*** 0.182*** 0.190*** 0.127*** 0.111*** 1.000
10 FEMALEi 0.028* 0.018 -0.011 -0.014 0.015 -0.008 -0.032** -0.010 -0.073*** 1.000   
11 NO_PHDi -0.138*** -0.088*** -0.015 -0.020 -0.010 -0.012 -0.047*** -0.032** -0.103*** -0.035** 1.000  
12 PHD_AGEi 0.138*** 0.102*** 0.043*** 0.030* 0.060*** 0.022 0.046*** 0.034** 0.454*** -0.117*** -0.078*** 1.000 
13 BIOi 0.024 0.036** -0.006 -0.006 0.010 -0.002 -0.022 -0.032** -0.103*** -0.035** -0.114*** 0.122*** 
14 PHYSICSi 0.136*** 0.101*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.039** 0.073*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.035** 0.053*** -0.106*** 0.201*** 
15 MECHANICALi  -0.037** -0.050*** 0.025 0.004 0.071*** 0.002 0.012 0.008 0.087*** -0.058*** -0.144*** -0.029*
16 ELECTRICALi -0.026* -0.052*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.007 -0.009 0.047*** -0.033** -0.026* -0.003 -0.115*** 0.043*** 
17 CHEMICALi  0.158*** 0.161*** -0.035** -0.019 -0.063*** -0.010 -0.053*** 0.069*** 0.029* -0.060*** -0.140*** 0.084*** 
18 CIVILi -0.130*** -0.104*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.030* -0.040** -0.014 0.005 0.032** 0.107*** -0.078*** -0.050***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Means by funding structure 
Funding No funding Public=0; 
Industry>0 
Public>0; 
Industry=0 
Public>0; 
Industry>0 
Anova 
F-Test 
Observations 2487 284 850 410 Sig. 
Researcher IDs 652 137 314 167  
Productivity measures  
PUBLICATIONSit 1.73 1.91 2.68*** 4.09*** *** 
CITATIONSit 25.73 21.63 38.80*** 64.49*** *** 
Funding measures (in 100,000 GBP)  
FUNDINGit-1 0.01 0.25*** 0.62*** 1.41*** *** 
PUBFUNDit-1 0.00 0.00 0.59*** 0.98*** *** 
INDFUNDit-1 0.00 0.22*** 0.00 0.34*** ***
UKFUNDit-1 0.00 0.00 0.50*** 0.86*** *** 
EUFUNDit-1 0.00 0.00 0.09*** 0.12*** *** 
Patent measure   
PATENTit-1 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13*** *** 
Individual characteristics   
PROFESSORit-1 0.25 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.62*** *** 
FEMALEi 0.07 0.03*** 0.08 0.06 ** 
NO_PHDi 0.09 0.06* 0.02*** 0.03*** *** 
PHD_AGEi 17.79 17.37 18.60** 20.17*** *** 
BIOi 0.07 0.04** 0.08 0.11*** *** 
PHYSICSi 0.14 0.18** 0.18*** 0.15 *** 
MECHANICALi 0.12 0.18*** 0.14** 0.17*** *** 
ELECTRICALi 0.22 0.17** 0.21 0.23 n.s. 
CHEMICALi 0.16 0.10*** 0.15 0.11*** *** 
CIVILi 0.20 0.27*** 0.21 0.21 ** 
Mean comparison test compares observations with funding (columns 2-4) to observations with no funding (column 1).   
Analysis of variance compares the four groups of researchers. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Effects of competitive funding on publication outcomes 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES PUBLICATIONSit CITATIONSit
 NBREG NBREG 
   Coef. SE Coef. SE 
  
FUNDINGit-1 0.039** (0.020) 0.070* (0.037) 
PATENT it-1 0.140*** (0.048) 0.099* (0.059) 
PROFESSORit-1 0.401*** (0.051) 0.729*** (0.085) 
FEMALEi 0.033 (0.104) 0.022 (0.163) 
NO_PHDi -0.751*** (0.156) -1.056*** (0.244) 
PHD_AGEit -0.018*** (0.003) -0.028*** (0.005) 
BIOi 0.268*** (0.087) 0.622*** (0.162) 
PHYSICSi 0.356*** (0.075) 0.658*** (0.128) 
MECHANICALi 0.117 (0.079) 0.076 (0.137) 
ELECTRICALi 0.188*** (0.069) 0.337*** (0.124) 
CHEMICALi 0.355*** (0.072) 0.610*** (0.120) 
CIVILi (Reference)     
ln[Pub_Mean]|ln[Cit_Mean] 0.273*** (0.040) 0.235*** (0.039) 
[Pub_Mean=0]|[Cit_Mean=0] -0.387*** (0.078) -0.198 (0.129) 
Pub_Stock|Cit_Stock 0.040*** (0.005) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Constant -0.456*** (0.151) 1.135*** (0.225) 
Joint sign. of university dummies χ2 (14) 133.00***  126.63***  
Joint sign. of subject dummies χ2 (5) 34.07***  44.29***  
Joint sign. of year dummies χ2 (4) 10.53**  21.66***  
Log-likelihood -6754.178 -13993.916  
Lnalpha -0.960***  1.252***  
Cluster 809  809  
Observations 4031  4031  
Note: Coefficients are reported. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; clustered by individual researcher.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 5: Marginal effects for funding values and their interactions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PUBit PUBit CITit CITit 
 NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
          
PubFundit-1 0 .074*  1.667**  
(0.038)  (0.714)  
UKFundit-1 0.054*  1.292** 
(0.032)  (0.657) 
EUFundit-1 0.210 6.900 
(0.209)  (4.377) 
IndFund it-1 0.186* 0.212* 1.392 1.083 
(0.111) (0.123) (2.216) (2.450) 
IndFund it-1 *PubFund it-1 -0.074**  -2.648 ***  
(0.035)  (1.020)  
IndFund it-1 *UKFund it-1 -0.072** -2.536** 
(0.031)  (1.012) 
IndFund it-1 *EUFund it-1 -0.379  -2.843 
(0.313) (5.694) 
UKFund it-1 *EUFund it-1 0.135  1.023 
(0.097)  (2.009) 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated following eq. (4) and eq. (5) at the sample mean. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A1: List of Universities 
29 
 
University Name Academics Observations Region 
Brunel University 48 240 London 
City University 23 112 London 
Queen Mary University 31 153 London 
University of Reading 22 110 South East 
University of Cambridge 123 604 East 
University of Essex 26 130 East 
University of Leicester 29 144 East Midlands 
Loughborough University 123 612 East Midlands 
University of Durham 21 95 North East 
Lancaster University 10 50 North West 
University of Sheffield 100 491 Yorkshire 
University of Edinburgh 54 266 Scotland 
University of Glasgow 63 313 Scotland 
University of Strathclyde 97 481 Scotland 
University of Swansea 46 230 Wales 
Total 809* 4031  
*Academics can change university within the sample. Therefore numbers do not add up to 809. 
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Table B1: Marginal effects including outlier observations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PUBit PUBit CITit CITit 
 NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
          
PubFundit-1 0 .085**  1.829**  
(0.041)  (0.767)  
UKFundit-1 0.065* 1.365** 
(0.035)  (0.676) 
EUFundit-1 0.127  4.567 
(0.226) (4.485) 
IndFund it-1 0.056 0.172 0.331 1.421 
(0.143) (0.123) (2.252) (2.439) 
IndFund it-1 *PubFund it-1 -0.097** -2.390***
(0.041)  (0.903)  
IndFund it-1 *UKFund it-1 -0.093**  -2.454*** 
(0.042) (0.847) 
IndFund it-1 *EUFund it-1 -0.583***  -7.843 
(0.157)  (7.469) 
UKFund it-1 *EUFund it-1 0.114 2.168* 
(0.100)  (1.306) 
Log-likelihood -6820.239 -6817.360 -14121.763 -14120.854 
Lnalpha -0.939*** -0.944*** 1.256*** 1.255*** 
Cluster 809 809 809 809 
Observations 4045 4045 4045 4045 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated following eq. (4) and eq. (5) at the sample mean. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B2: Marginal effects including government funding 
(1) (2)
VARIABLES PUBit CITit
 NBREG NBREG 
      
PubFundit-1 (incl. GovFundit-1) 0.078** 1.851**
(0.038) (0.767) 
IndFund it-1 0.203* 1.792 
(0.118) (2.358) 
IndFund it-1 *PubFund it-1 -0.080** -2.735*** 
(0.035) (0.903) 
Log-likelihood -6752.346 -13991.327 
Lnalpha -0.960*** 1.250*** 
Cluster 809 809 
Observations 4031 4031 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated following eq. (4) and eq. (5) at the sample mean. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Effect of industry funding on the marginal effect of public funding on publication numbers 
Note: All other variables are held at the sample mean 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted number of publications for different levels of public funding 
Note: All other variables are held at the sample mean 
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Figure 3: Effect of industry funding on the marginal effect of public funding on citation numbers 
Note: All other variables are held at the sample mean 
 
 
Figure 4: Predicted number of publications for different levels of public funding 
Note: All other variables are held at the sample mean 
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